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WATER SUBSIDIES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: Do THEY
EXIST AND HAVE THEY CONTRIBUTED TO URBAN SPRAWL? A
COMMENT ON AN ARTICLE BY STEVEN P. ERIE AND PASCALE
JOASSART-MARCELLI TITLED 'UNRAVELING SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA'S WATER/GROWTH NEXUS: METROPOLITAN
WATER DISTRICT POLICES AND SUBSIDIES FOR SUBURBAN

DEVELOPMENT, 1928-1996'
MARK P. BERKMAN* AND JESSE DAVID"
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES*"

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Steven Erie and Pascale Joassart-Marcelli recently co-authored a paper
reviewing the financing methods of the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California (MWD) and analyzing the relationship between this financing and historical growth in Southern California.' They make several

assertions, including:
* regional water policy has shaped suburban development in Southern
California and promoted sprawl as opposed to "smart growth"; 2
Vice President, National Economic Research Associates; B.A., Urban Affairs and Economics, George Washington University; M.A., Urban Planning and Policy Analysis, Harvard
University; Ph.D., Public Policy Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School.
" Senior Consultant, National Economic Research Associates; B.A., Economics and
Physics, Brandeis University; Ph.D., Economics, Stanford University.
- National Economics Research Associates is an independent consultant to public and
private entities, including the San Diego County Water Authority. Funding for this comment
was provided by the San Diego County Water Authority. Additional information regarding
National Economics Research Associates can be found at www.nera.com.
I. See Steven P. Erie & Pascale Joassart-Marcelli, Unraveling Southern California'sWater/Growth Nexus: Metropolitan Water District Policies and Subsidiesfor Suburban Development, 1928-1996, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 267 (2000).
2. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 270, 288-89.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 1, Art. 9
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

* subsidization of water costs to the rest of the region by the City of
Los Angeles has been a central element of this policy;3 and
" pricing water wheeled through MWD at incremental costs would perpetuate this subsidization and related sprawl.4
The authors, however, fail to provide adequate support for any of these
claims. In particular, their definition of a "subsidy" is flawed. In the context
of joint payment for a common resource, a "subsidy" implies that existing
users of the resource sacrifice funds to supply another user at less than the
incremental cost imposed by that user. This definition, which the authors
have apparently ignored, is well supported in the literature regarding pricing
by utilities. The "subsidy" that they measure is simply a difference in total
historical payments,5 which bears little, if any, relationship to the actual
prices faced by the various members of MWD, the benefits they ultimately
received, or their share of MWD's total costs. They present no evidence that
any of MWD's members have paid less than the incremental cost of serving
them. Ultimately, they present no evidence that a true economic subsidy exists. In fact, it is quite likely that the City of Los Angeles has benefited from
the annexation of the outlying areas, such as San Diego County Water Authority, into MWD. Determining the existence and magnitude of any subsidy, properly defined, is beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, using
an alternate definition of the term, one might just as easily state that the outlying areas have "subsidized" the City of Los Angeles.
Erie and Joassart-Marcelli then use their "subsidy" measure to draw
conclusions about "overpayments" and "underpayments" for water and how
these have affected regional growth rates in Southern California. 6 However,
even assuming that a difference in average water costs represents a "subsidy," the authors' technique for measuring it is flawed in many respects.
They find that, from the years 1929 through 1996, the City and County of
Los Angeles paid a higher per-acre-foot price for MWD water than other
Southern California counties ($794 and $368, respectively, compared to the
MWD average of $349).7 Based on this, they claim that the City and County
of Los Angeles have, "subsidized" the other members of MWD by about
$2.2 billion.8 These figures, however, fail to account for numerous important costs and benefits that have differed historically between the member
agencies. Using a methodology that we believe represents a more accurate
depiction of the net costs and benefits received by each of MWD's constituents, we find that the City of Los Angeles has "subsidized" the other members of MWD by less than $1.0 billion, compared to Erie and JoassartMarcelli's value of $1.9 billion, and that the "subsidy" received by San
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 277.
id. at 289-90.
id. at 277-83.
id. at 280-82.
id. at 277 tbl.3.
Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 289.
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Diego is only about $80 million, compared to Erie and Joassart-Marcelli's
value of $1.3 billion.9 We find that Los Angeles County (excluding the
City) has actually received a "subsidy" of over $100 million, rather than
paying a "subsidy" of about $300 million. We also find the "subsidy" received by Orange County to be substantially reduced.
In our calculation of average historical costs, we include the following
factors that were ignored by Erie and Joassart-Marcelli:
* First, the authors acknowledge that perhaps the primary benefit of
MWD to thi: City of Los Angeles has been insurance against the
failure of its Owens Valley supplies.10 Yet, their average cost measurement includes no accounting for this value. We find that incorporating a conservative estimate of insurance or "option" value reduces the "subsidies" received by San Diego and Orange Counties
by about $100 million each and reduces the "subsidy" paid by the
City of Los Angeles by almost $300 million.
* Second, agricultural and untreated water has a lower value than
treated water. The outlying regions, in particular San Diego, have
purchased much more of this lower value water than the City of Los
Angeles. Omitting this consideration leads to a faulty measurement
of the difference in cost per unit of water between the regions. We
find that adjusting for water quality reduces the "subsidy" received
by San Diego by over $600 million and by-Riverside by about $240
million, while reducing the "subsidy" paid by the City and County
of Los Angeles by a combined $700 million.
" Third, even the quality of MWD's treated water has differed between
regions. The same outlying regions that Erie and Joassart-Marcelli
claim have benefited from a subsidy have also historically received a
greater proportion of the lower quality (higher salinity) Colorado
River water. Again, ignoring this factor tends to bias their average
cost measurement. We find that adjusting for salinity-related costs
reduces the "subsidy" received by San Diego and Orange Counties
by over $200 million each and reduces the "subsidy" paid by Riverside, Ventura and the City of Los Angeles by a total of almost $500
million.
" Fourth, the authors make no attempt to adjust for the residual value of
the investments that have been made into MWD's system. The infrastructure owned by MWD is worth billions of dollars. MWD is
currently evaluating claims to the assets of this system based on historical capital contributions. Since the City of Los Angeles has
made a greater share of these contributions, according to MWD's
methodology, it presumably has a disproportionate claim to these assets. This is yet another omitted factor that skews their results to in9. See id at 288-89.
10. See id at 283.
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dicate that Los Angeles has "subsidized" the other regions. We find
that correcting for ownership shares in MWD reduces the "subsidy"
received by San Diego by about $400 million and by Orange County
by about $150 million, while reducing the "subsidy" paid by the
City of Los Angeles by over $500 million.
Fifth, Erie and Joassart-Marcelli only used data through 1996 and
presented their results in 1996 dollars. 1 We have updated the average cost calculation through 1999.
Erie and Joassart-Marcelli analyze the statistical relationship between
historical water costs and growth among the various counties in Southern
California using their "subsidy" measure. 2 This analysis is also seriously
flawed. Although the cost of water may certainly affect the incentives for
growth, the measure used by the authors in no way reflects the actual cost of
water faced by developers in Southern California. As is well known, the incremental cost of water has historically been equal across all Southern California regions-any new user of water in an annexed area would have paid
MWD's property tax and volume-based water rate, exactly the same as in
Los Angeles. Fixed costs paid by member agencies, the primary drivers of
the authors' total cost differentials, do not affect individual decisions to locate or develop. In addition, as the authors themselves point out, many other
variables affect growth besides costs paid to MWD; however they controlled
only for water payments. Erie and Joassart-Marcelli identify only a correlation between growth rates and average historical water cost' 3 -they do not
demonstrate causation. In fact, an argument can be made that the causation
goes the other way: the reason that outlying areas such as San Diego have
enjoyed an apparent "subsidy" is because they have grown so fast since their
annexation to MWD. Differences in water costs between regions, as measured by Erie and Joassart-Marcelli, cannot have had a direct effect on growth
rates.
Finally, the authors conclude that if MWD were to charge incremental
cost-based wheeling rates for excess capacity, this historic "subsidization"
would be perpetuated. 4 By definition, an incremental cost-based wheeling
charge will not result in any subsidies. This is the whole point of pricing at
incremental cost. Instead, such a policy would finally send the appropriate
signals for rational economic growth. Moreover, an unbundled approach to
pricing could incorporate differences between the supply and demand profiles of MWD's members, including those mentioned above, and finally provide a connection between how much each of the members pay and what
quality and quantity of services they actually receive. The issue of past contributions to MWD's finances is an equity or "fairness" concern, which
11. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, 274-285 tbls. 1-6, 8.
12. See id. at 286-87 tbls.9-10.
13. See id. at 284-87, 290.
14. See id. at 290.
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should be addressed separately from determining the efficient pricing for
MWD's services.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we
define the meaning of the term "subsidy" from an economic perspective and
examine whether Erie and Joassart-Marcelli's measure conforms to this
standard. In Section I,we identify four important components of the costs
and benefits of membership in MWD that Erie and Joassart-Marcelli's average cost measure does not include. In Section IV, we quantify these adjustments and show that Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's finding that the City and
County of Los Angeles have "subsidized" the rest of MWD is quite sensitive
to their omission of these relevant factors. In Section V, we examine Erie's
and Joassart-Marcelli's analysis of the relationship between MWD costs and
population growth rates. Finally, in Section VI, we discuss the distinction
between past practices of MWD and the proper pricing method going forward.
II. WHAT IS THE PROPER DEFINITION OF A "SUBSIDY"?

Erie and Joassart-Marcelli define a subsidy as simply a differing average historical cost for water between two of MWD's member agencies. 5
Thus, if Region A has paid more per acre-foot of water since its annexation
to MWD than Region B, including expenditures in the form of property
taxes, water purchases and other payments, then the authors would assert
that Region A has subsidized Region B. However, this definition does not
meet the standard of the economics profession. In fact, there is an extensive
literature regarding the allocation of common costs for the provision of public utilities. For example, in a seminal work in the field, Faulhaber defines a
subsidy-free pricing scheme as follows: "If the provision of any commodity.., leads to prices for the other commodities no higher' 6than they would
pay by themselves, then the price structure is subsidy-free."'
Although any pricing scheme for the allocation of common costs may
be subject to criticism, economists have developed some minimal requirements for an efficient cost allocation that is also "fair and reasonable."' 7
Generally speaking, such a system must pass two tests: the stand-alone cost
test and the incremental cost test.18 The stand-alone cost test simply "requires that the cost borne by each user of the system not exceed that user's

15. See generally Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note I, at 277-283.
16. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization:Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AMER.
ECON. REV. 966, 966 (1975).
17. See generally David J.Salant & G. Campbell Watkins, Cost-Allocation Principles
for Pipeline Capacityand Usage, 8 ENERGY STUDIES REv. 91 (1996) (arguing that some current cost allocation plans involving multiple-use pipelines conflict with commonly accepted
norms of fairness); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS (1988).
18. See Salant & Watkins, supra note 3, at 93.
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stand-alone costs."' 9 Essentially, this reiterates the above definition: each
user must be better off after participating in the enterprise than it would be
outside of the system. The incremental cost test simply requires that each
user must pay at least as much to participate
in the system as the incremental
2
cost of including that user on the system. 0
We can now place these standards into the context of the Southern California water markets. Two conditions must have held in order to characterize MWD's pricing scheme as subsidy-free: 1) MWD's annexation of outlying areas and its subsequent pricing scheme allowed Los Angeles to gain the
services of MWD at lower cost than if these areas had not been annexed; and
2) pricing to the outlying areas has covered at least the incremental cost of
including them in the system. Thus, if Los Angeles has received benefits
since its initiation of MWD that are greater than the costs it has incurred, and
if the other regions have at least paid the incremental costs for supplying
them from the pre-existing system, then MWD has not subsidized anyone.
Clearly, Erie and Joassart-Marcelli have not defined their measure of a "subsidy" according to these well-accepted principles.
Through its early property tax payments, Los Angeles initially provided
the major portion of the capital required to start MWD before outlying regions were even invited to join. At the outset, this system had substantial
excess capacity. Despite this fact, Los Angeles turned to other sources such
as Owens Valley for its primary water supply. According to Erie and Joassart-Marcelli, these sources provided lower cost water because they avoided
expensive pumping. 2l MWD, however, provided Los Angeles with a number of benefits in addition to its modest water purchases. As the authors
point out, "In effect, Los Angeles bought an expensive drought insurance
policy should its Owens Valley supplies prove insufficient."2 2
Subsequently, MWD induced other entities to join by offering water at a
low price; that is, below MWD's average historical cost, but not necessarily
below the incremental cost of adding the new members to the system.' This
enabled MWD to earn revenues it would not have earned otherwise, defraying costs while allowing Los Angeles to maintain access to the system as
drought insurance and a buffer for growth. The low price reflected the low
incremental cost of adding these outlying areas to the system once the main
components of the infrastructure were in place. In essence, both Los Angeles and the outlying areas that later were annexed into MWD benefited from
the relationship; thus, Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's use of the term "subsidy" is misplaced.
In order to detect the presence of a subsidy, properly defined, and to
measure its magnitude and direction, it would be necessary to calculate the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
See id.
See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1,at 273.
Id. at 283.
See id. at 276.
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incremental costs incurred by MWD with the annexation of each member, as
well as each member's net benefits and the costs of their alternatives. This
could be achieved via a model simulating the MWD system, but this is
clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
IH. WHAT FACTORS DETERMINE THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
MEMBERSHIP IN MWD?

Erie and Joassart-Marcelli calculate the average historical cost of water
for the City and County of Los Angeles and the other counties served by
MWD. As discussed above, we do not believe that this is an appropriate
way to measure whether there have been any interregional subsidies. However, even as a simple measure of costs and benefits, Erie's and JoassartMarcelli's methodology is flawed. Their first unstated assumption is that all
benefits gained by MWD's member agencies can be measured by simply
adding up total historical water purchases. Similarly, their only measure of
costs is total dollar payments to MWD. Many other factors, however, affect
the cost-benefit balances of MWD's constituents. In this section, we examine some of the most important differences between the costs and benefits
received by the various members. In the next section we propose a methodology and use it to quantify the effect that including these factors has on
Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's average cost calculation.
First, Erie and Joassart-Marcelli make no attempt to account for any
value received by MWD's member agencies other than total water purchases. Although the authors note that the primary benefit obtained by Los
Angeles was insurance against the failure of its other supplies to meet demand in drought years or to accommodate future growth, they measure the
benefits of membership by simply totaling up historical water withdrawals.
They do not account for the value of this insurance.
For some members, the value of this insurance is considerable. For example, the City of Los Angeles has varied its MWD water deliveries far
more than any other member agency, relying heavily on MWD during
drought years, such as 1987 through 1992, but turning to its other sources
during normal and wet years. Figure 1 demonstrates the variability of the
City of Los Angeles's purchases compared to those of other regions.25 This
chart shows that the standard deviation of the City of Los Angeles's annual
purchases is more than twice that of any other region, except San Bernardino, when taken as a ratio of average purchases. 26 This effect is not related
24. See id. at 281 tbl.6.
25. Following the methodology of Erie and Joassart-Marcelli, we use the counties served
by MWD as the unit of measurement, but separate out the City of Los Angeles. The region
identified as "Los Angeles" represents all of Los Angeles County excluding the City.
26. Substantial variation was observed during the first several years of each region's
membership in MWD as each region "ramped up" its purchases from MWD. To isolate the
variation that occurred after the "ramp up" period, Figure I uses annual data omitting the first

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000

7

California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 1, Art. 9
[Vol. 37
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

to varying rates of population growth; we found similar results when examining per-capita water purchases. This finding reflects the fact that the City
of Los Angeles uses MIWD as a supplier of last resort, while other agencies
rely on MWD for their baseline level of purchases.
Figure 1
Variability in Water Withdrawals from MWD:
Ratio of Standard Deviation to Average, Based on Annual Purchases, 1929.1999
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When one or more agencies vary their purchases to such an extent, the
others must bear the cost of maintaining the system during normal or wet
years. MWD has developed substantial supply and conveyance potential to
meet peak and dry year demands. The cost of these facilities is primarily related to their peak capacity, rather than the average volumes they handle.
MWD's historical rate structure, however, has financed the cost associated
with these facilities and supplies primarily from revenues derived from the
sale of water during wet and normal years. Essentially, the agencies that
support MWD's facilities by providing a baseline level of purchases provide
an insurance policy, or option, for those that do not. Obviously, crediting no
value to such insurance will lead to an overstatement of any "subsidy" from
Los Angeles to the outlying areas.
A further problem with Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's average cost
measure is that the quality of water purchased from MWD has not been constant across the member agencies. As the authors point out, the outlying regions have withdrawn a significant portion of their water for agricultural
use.' Figure 2 shows that, since their initiation into MWD, the City and
ten years of each agency's membership.
27. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 269.
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County of Los Angeles, Orange County, and Ventura County have withdrawn primarily treated water for domestic use, while Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego Counties have purchased much more lower quality
untreated water and less reliable agricultural water. Treated water for domestic consumption has both a higher value and higher cost than the other
types of water-based on quality and reliability factors. Erie and JoassartMarcelli consider all water purchases to be of equal value. This factor further biases their results towards indicating that Los Angeles has "subsidized"
these other regions.
In addition, even treated water has historically differed in quality between the member agencies. ,MWD has two primary sources for imported
water, the State Water Project (SWP) and the Colorado River Aqueduct
(CRA). CRA water has a much higher salinity content than SWP water.
This leads to greater costs for users in the form of wear on plumbing appliances, increased demand for water softening, and adverse effects of water
recycling efforts. Historically, MWD has not attempted to deliver the same
mix of CRA and SWP water to each of its constituents. Therefore, MWD's
members have borne unequal salinity-related costs.
Figure 3 demonstrates the salinity levels at the various MWD treatment
facilities. The three facilities that receive primarily CRA water have had a
Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) level more than 80 percent higher than the two
facilities that receive primarily SWP water.
Figure 2
Water Withdrawals from MWD:
by Type, 1929-1999
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Figure 3
Salinity Levels at MWD Treatment Facilities:
Average of Monthly Values, 1980-1999
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Determining which facilities supply each of MWD's members is a difficult task, since many agencies are served by more than one MWD facility.
We do know, however, that San Diego receives all of its water from the
Skinner facility, and thus has suffered a high salinity level. Orange and San
Bernardino Counties also obtain most of their water from the high-salinity
sources. On the other hand, Los Angeles, Ventura and Riverside Counties
obtain lower salinity water.
MWD has recently evaluated changes to its blending policy. Section
136 of the MWD Act states that MWD shall provide an equal blend of SWP
water and CRA water to each of its members, to the extent reasonable and
practicable. MWD is now considering the adoption of a 500 mg/l TDS target for each of its members. A recent study by MWD indicated that a difference in TDS levels of 100 mg/I is worth about $100 million per year across
the whole of MWD. 28 In a similar analysis, MWD found that the cost to San
Diego is currently about $45 million per year, relative to a more equitable
policy of providing each agency with 500 mg/I TDS.29 Such historical cost
differences are not accounted for in Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's analysis;
they omit any consideration of costs suffered by the agencies receiving high
28. See METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, U.S. BUREAU OF

RECLAMATION, SALINITY MANAGEMENT STUDY FINAL REPORT 2-20 Fig.2-18 (June 1999).
29. Results from MWD salinity model provided to San Diego County Water Authority
[hereinafter SDCWA].
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salinity water.
Finally, Erie and Joassart-Marcelli ignore the fact that the investments
into MWD have not been used up; all the historical capital contributions
made by MWD's members have generated a massive infrastructure that has
considerable value going forward. According to MWD's latest annual report, the book value of the assets in its system is over $4 billion. This
amount is likely to be conservative in comparison to MWD's true economic
value.
To put this value in perspective, consider the hypothetical situation of
privatizing MWD. In this scenario, the shares of MWD's assets would be
distributed to the member agencies according to some measure of total historical contributions. Such a scenario is not totally unthinkable; MWD has,
in fact, considered a "shareholder model" as a candidate for restructuring
and has also developed algorithms for determining equity shares. In any
case, MWD's assets are ultimately owned by its members, so some method
must be used to determine allocation.
MWD has identified several potential measures to determine representation by its members. Under almost all of these, the City and County of Los
Angeles have the largest shares, much larger than their shares of historical
water purchases. Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's calculations do not consider
the fact that MWD's members have disproportionate claims to MWD's assets. Their methodology essentially assumes that the value of MWD's assets
is zero, or, equivalently, that each member agency has a claim that is proportionate to their total historical water purchases.
The bias introduced by failing to account for this value is demonstrated
in Figure 4. The pie-graph on the left shows one of MWD's measures for
representation based on some components of historical capital payments,
known as "preferential rights."3 We do not endorse this method for allocating MWD's assets; however, for the purposes of this analysis, we assume
that this method, or one like it, will ultimately be used. The pie-graph on the
right shows each region's share of total water purchases. This demonstrates
that, according to MWD's methodology, San Diego has a much smaller
claim to MWD assets than its share of historical water purchases. The City
of Los Angeles has a much larger claim. Any measure of the benefits received from membership in MWD should account for claims on the assets
owned jointly by the member agencies. Omitting such a measure again biases a "subsidy" measurement in favor of Los Angeles and against the outlying regions.
30. Preferential rights are defined in Section 135 of the Metropolitan Water District Act
(1969). See CAL. WATER CODE § 135 (West 2000). This measure includes property taxes and
other fixed annual fees (not adjusted for inflation) that are unrelated to water purchases. See
iU. Shares for MWD members have been combined by county and rounded in Figure 3.
MWD has also begun evaluating adjustments to this method that incorporate inflation and
interest and also some components of water rate revenues that have been set aside for capital
expenditures. Their adjustments do not substantially change the rankings or relative shares.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
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Figure 4
Preferential Rights
Based on Fixed Payments, 1929-1999
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IV. ACCOUNTING FOR IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MWD'S
MEMBERS SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERS THE AVERAGE COST CALCULATION

The discussion in the previous section illustrates how a simple average
cost measure fails to capture the true differences in the benefits received by
MWD's member agencies. In general, such a measure should attempt to account for other costs and benefits derived from membership in MWD in addition to the total quantity of water purchased and the total amount of payments made. In this section, we propose an improved methodology and use
it to quantify the value of each of the adjustments proposed above. After
each adjustment, we report the effect on the average historical cost to each of
MWD's regions. At the end of the section we summarize the total effect
these adjustments have on Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's "subsidy" calculation.
As described in the previous section, some of MWD's members have
other sources for a large portion of their water needs. These agencies, in
particular the City of Los Angeles, turn to MWD in times of drought, but in
normal and wet years do not purchase substantial volumes. Essentially,
membership in MWD confers an "option" to a municipal water agency.
That is, the payment of property taxes and other fixed fees allows each
agency to purchase water at MWD's volume-based water rate, up to their
preferential right, should they decide to exercise that option. The value of
this option is dependent on several factors, including the probability that the
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Figure 5
Palmer Drought Index for Southern California
1941-1999
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option will be exercised, the value of water during the years the option is exercised, and the maximum quantity of water that can be purchased.
The probability of exercise is related to weather conditions-the more
often a drought occurs, the more frequently the options are likely to be exercised. The widely used Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is one measure of the conditions that determine water use.3 A PDSI value less than -3.0
indicates "severe" drought conditions; a value between -2.99 and -2.0 is
considered to indicate a "moderate" drought; and a value between -1.99 and
-1.0 denotes a "mild" drought. 32 Figure 5 charts the value for this index in
Southern California over the last 50 years. 33 From this data, we determined
that Southern California has experienced droughts in these categories 7 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent of the time, respectively, since 1941. For
purposes of our analysis, we assume that these probabilities are representative of the expectations for any given year.
The value of water during drought years will depend on the water rate
31. See Dr. Michael J. Hayes, Drought Indices, National Drought Mitigation Center I
(visited March 2000) <http://enso.unl.edulizdmic/enigina/indices.htm#palhner>.Western states
often supplement the PDSI with other indices, for example the Surface Water Supply Index,
which takes into account a non-uniform topography. See id.
32. See id. at 4.

33. For more information on the PDSI and other indices used to measure the deviation of
precipitation from established norms, see Dr. Michael J. Hayes, Drought Indices, National
Drought Mitigation Center (visited) <http://enso.unl.edulndnc/enigma/indices.htmn#palner>.
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charged by MWD and the alternatives available to each agency. In the past,
MWD has not increased its water rate during drought periods. Thus, water
purchased during a dry year has a greater value-but not a greater costthan water purchased during a wet year. This excess value is one of the
components of the option value. To measure this value, we examine the cost
of alternative water supplies during dry periods. In fact, MWD's own policies give some indication of this value. Currently, MWD provides a subsidy
of $250 per acre-foot for local reclamation or demand-reducing projects.
This provides evidence that the policy-makers at MWD believe that during
periods of severe drought, when these resources will be fully utilized, the
value of water is at least $250 per acre-foot greater than the basic volumebased water rate charged by MWD. '3 MWD currently charges $431 per
acre-foot for domestic treated water. We therefore assume that the value of
water in a "severe" drought (as defined by the PDI) is 58 percent higher
($250 / $431) than the value of water in a wet year. We assume that the
premium on water in a "moderate" drought is half as much, or 29 percent,
and that the premium in a "mild" drought is half of this, or 14.5 percent.
Finally, the quantity of options available in a given year depends on the
difference between the typical annual purchases of each agency and that
agency's preferential right. No option value is available for members that
generally purchase more than their preferential right, such as San Diego and
Orange Counties, since they would not be able to substantially increase their
purchases in drought years.
We now have the pieces needed to construct a valuation of the option to
purchase extra water. For each region in each year, we calculate the difference between the average annual purchases over the prior fifteen years and
the preferential right of that region (a portion of total MWD sales in that
year). This generates the "quantity" of options, measured in acre-feet, that is
available in that year. The value of each option is then calculated by weighting the premium on water value in each of the three drought scenarios by the
probability that each scenario will occur. The total option value for each
year is then simply this "price" multiplied by the "quantity."
Essentially, one can consider membership in MWD to confer two separate benefits: 1) actual water purchases; and 2) for regions that generally
purchase less than their preferential right, options for a higher level of purchases during periods when the value of water is more than MWD's price.
In order to calculate an average per-unit cost measure, like Erie's and Joassart-Marcelli's, 35 which incorporates this option value, we subtract the calcu34. This is probably a very conservative estimate of the premium for water in a severe
drought year. Other alternative water sources that are being examined to fulfill drought
needs, such as desalination, cost as much as $1000 per acre-foot above MWD's water rate. In
its 1996 assessment of dry year supply options, MWD identified the cost of the "last resort"
option before desalination, groundwater recovery, to be more than $400 per acre-foot higher
than the cost of its imported supplies. See IMETRO.WATER DIST., SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA'S
INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 3-29 (Mar. 1996).
35. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1,at 277 tbl.3.
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lated option value from total annual payments made by each region. Summing total payments through 1996 (after converting to 1996 dollars) and
then dividing by total water purchases results in a new value for each regions' average per-unit cost.
Table I shows the results of this calculation.
Table 1
AVERAGE HISTORICAL WATER COST:
ADJUSTMENT FOR "OPTION" VALUE ONLY

Region
City of LA
San Bernardino
AVERAGE

Los Angeles
Orange
Riverside
San Diego
Ventura

Change from Erie's and
Joassart-Marcelli's Value
($1996 per acre-foot)
-78
-10
-9
-7
0
0
0
0

Next, we examine the purchasing patterns of MWD's constituents by
water type. To account for the fact that some agencies purchase lower quality or less reliable water from MWD, either untreated or agricultural water,
we created a "quality-adjusted" measure of annual water purchases for each
agency. Essentially, we assume that the value of each different type of water
is reflected in its price, and we then weight the quantity purchased in each
year by this value. For example, suppose MWD's price for untreated agricultural water in a given year is half its price for treated domestic water.
Then suppose one agency purchased 100 acre-feet of agricultural water in
that year. We would then assume that this purchase was equivalent to 50
acre-feet of treated domestic water. Using this method, we calculate the
equivalent volume of treated domestic water purchased by each agency in
each year. By reducing the measure of water purchased by those agencies
that used significant quantities of untreated water, this method increases
such agencies' average costs.
Table 2 shows the effect this correction alone has on the average historical costs.
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Table 2
AVERAGE HISTORICAL WATER COST:
ADJUSTMENT FOR WATER TYPE ONLY

Region
Ventura
Los Angeles
Orange
AVERAGE
City of LA
San Diego
San Bernardino
Riverside

Change from Erie's and
Joassart-Marcelli' s
Value
($1996 per acre-foot)
8
14
31
46
48
74
80
122

Next, we account for the different levels of salinity in the water received
by MWD's members. First, we use data on the TDS levels at each of
MWD's treatment facilities and calculate an average TDS for all of MWD's
37
imported water.36 We then determine which facility supplies each region.
This allows us to compare the TDS level attained by each region to the average across MWD.
A recent MWD salinity study reported that, at current consumption
rates, a 100 mg/ increase in the TDS level of all imported water results in a
cost increase of about $100 million across all of MWD. 31 This translates to
$0.60 per acre-foot for each I mg/ increase or decrease in TDS. 39 By apply36. We used water quality data back to 1980. This adjustment does not account for any
difference in salinity-related costs before that year. The State Water Project came online in
the mid-1970's. Annual TDS data is based on a simple average of monthly values at each
treatment facility. See Spreadsheet from MWD Water Quality Division (March 2000) (on file

with the authors).
37. We assume that the regions obtain their water from the following facilities: City of
Los Angeles: 50% Jensen, 25% Weymouth, 25% Diemer; County of Los Angeles: 50%
Weymouth, 25% Jensen, 25% Diemer; Orange County: 100% Diemer; San Diego County:
100% Skinner; San Bernardino County: 100% Weymouth; Riverside County: 100% Mills;
Ventura County: 100% Jensen. See generally 2 METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA'S INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN (March
1996).
38. See METROPOLITAN WATER DiSTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, SALINITY MANAGEMENT STUDY FINAL REPORT 2-20, Fig.2-18 (June 1999).
39. This appears to be a conservative estimate for salinity costs in prior years. An earlier
study by the Bureau of Reclamation, published in 1988. found that salinity-related costs have
been even higher, as much as $2 per acre-foot for each I mg/l change in TDS levels. See
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ing this figure to the difference between each agency's TDS and the average
TDS, we then calculate the costs or benefits imposed on each region due to
MWD's blending policy, relative to a scenario where each region received
water with the system-wide average TDS level. We add or subtract this dollar amount from the total payments by each region in each year. Once again,
we calculate the effect this adjustment had on each region's costs through
1996. Table 3 reports the effect this adjustment alone has on has on the average historical costs.
Table 3
AVERAGE HISTORICAL WATER COST:
ADJUSTMENT FOR SALINITY ONLY

Region
Riverside
Ventura
City of LA
Los Angeles

Change from Erie's and
Joassart-Marcelli's Value
($1996 per acre-foot)
-83
-74
-14
2

AVERAGE

0

San Diego
Orange
San Bernardino

20
20
31

Up to this point, all our adjustments have incorporated costs or benefits
derived from past membership in MWD. However, MWD now controls assets that have a significant value going forward. One estimate of the total
value of these assets is MWD's current book value, which, according to
MWD's latest annual report, is about $4 billion. In fact, the actual market
value is likely to be much higher, especially if demand for water services
and scarcity of supply continue to increase as expected.
In order to determine what fraction of this amount is "owned" by each
of the member agencies, some allocation method must be assumed. For example, MWD calculates preferential rights by finding the cumulative sum of
all fixed payments, unadjusted for inflation or interest, and then calculating
the fraction of these payments made by each agency.' MWD and some of
its members are currently evaluating other possible methods to determine
equity proportions, such as adjusting for inflation and the time value of
ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SALINITY OF THE COLORADO RIVER,
RECLAMATION (1988).

U.S.

BUREAU OF

40. Memorandum and spreadsheet from the Metropolitan Water District (Nov. 1999) (on
file with the authors).
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money.
We do not endorse these methods; they are generally based on accounting principles rather than on any consideration of true economic value. For
example, MWD's volume-based water rates and treatment surcharges are
much higher than the marginal cost of providing these services. That is, a
large portion of these payments is used to cover the capital and other fixed
costs associated with conveyance, distribution and treatment. However, for
the purpose of this analysis, we assume that an allocation system based only
on historical "fixed payments" (such as property taxes, standby charges and
connection charges) will be adopted.
To determine the effect of including this asset value on the net benefits
attained by each agency, we applied the preferential rights shares to MWD's
1996 book value of $3.363 billion.4 1 The resulting amounts were then subtracted from each agency's total historical payments. This calculation has
the result of lowering each region's historical per-unit cost. However, the
regions are not affected equally. Because San Diego has purchased such a
large quantity of water and yet has made a much smaller fraction of fixed
payments, it benefits the least from this adjustment on a per-unit basis; its
share of MWD's assets is worth about $53 for each acre-foot of water purchased to date. On the other hand, the City of Los Angeles's share of
MWD's assets is worth about $188 per acre-foot. Table 4 reports the effect
this adjustment alone has on has on the average costs for each region.
Table 4
AVERAGE HISTORICAL WATER COST:
ADJUSTMENT FOR ASSET VALUE ONLY

Region
City of LA
San Bernardino
Los Angeles
AVERAGE

Riverside
Ventura
Orange
San Diego

Change from Erie's and
Joassart-Marcelli's Value
($1996 per acre-foot)
-188
-77
-63
-62
-61
-49
-48
-33

Finally, we update this average cost measurement through 1999. Erie
and Joassart-Marcelli used data through 1996 and reported their results in
41. See METROPOLITAN WATER
REPORT (1999).

DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL FINANCIAL
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1996 dollars.42 We add the most recent three years of water and payment
data and then apply an inflation adjustment to report results in 1999 dollars.4 3 Figure 6 summarizes the results for this entire process (for comparison purposes, both sets of results in this figure are presented in 1996 dollars). We find that the ranking of the regions in terms of average costs is
much different than that found by Erie and Joassart-Marcelli. For example,
Ventura County's costs fall significantly, due to the high quality of water
purchased by the county. Los Angeles County (excluding the City) also falls
below average. We find the disparity between the City of Los Angeles's average cost and those of other regions to be substantially reduced, though
not eliminated.
v,At nts for a6WCdd1MWDEh4192w
we TypeSarty,
wm

Vaue

acdMAD sset Valte

7W

XII

.0

1311

Figure 6
Erie and Joassart-Marcelli use their average cost measure to calculate an
"loverpayment" or "underpayment" made by each region, relative to the average.41 Once again, although they claim this measures a "subsidy," they are
only correct in their use of the term in a limited, non-economic sense. We
perform the same calculation, based on our corrected average cost figures.
Table 5 reports the results of this calculation. The first row shows the total
"subsidy" value reported by Erie and Joassart-Marcelli. Rows two through
five show the individual effect of each of the adjustments made above. The
sixth row shows the cumulative effects of all the adjustments together. Finally, the last row incorporates the update to 1999.

42. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 273-285 tbls. 1-6, 8.

43. We used the Consumer Price Index. See ECONOMIC

REPORT OF THE PRESIENT 43-44

(1999).
44. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 280.
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In summary, we find that Erie and Joassart-Marcelli overestimate the
net "subsidy" received by San Diego by over $1 billion. Incorporating our
adjustments reduces it from about $1.3 billion to about $0.1 billion. The
"subsidy" measurement for Orange and San Bernardino Counties are also
substantially reduced. On the other hand, our measurement of the "subsidy"
paid by the City of Los Angeles is almost $1 billion less than Erie's and
Joassart-Marcelli's. We also find that Los Angeles County (excluding the
City) has in fact received a "subsidy" from MWD of over $100 million,
rather than paying a "subsidy" of about $300 million, as claimed by Erie and
Joassart-Marcelli. 45 We find that Riverside and Ventura Counties' "subsidies" are somewhat increased.
The adjustments we have undertaken in this section are by no means an
exhaustive set of corrections needed to identify the true costs and benefits of
past membership in MWD. In addition, many of the data sources are imperfect, but could be improved with access to the proper data and additional research. We do not intend for our final "overpayment" or "underpayment"
results to be considered as definitive, although they certainly do provide a
better approximation of net costs than the measure used by Erie and JoassartMarcelli. Our results show that the simple measure of average historical
cost is of little use in determining whether a particular agency or region
benefited from its membership in MWD more or less than the average, and it
certainly cannot be used to determine whether one region has subsidized another. Finally, any such measure of average historical cost is inappropriate
to identify a link between water prices and regional growth rates, as will be
discussed in the next section.
V. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WATER COSTS, AS DEFINED BY ERIE AND
JOASSART-MARCELLI, HAVE NOT BEEN A FACTOR IN DETERMINING

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Erie and Joassart-Marcelli test for a statistical relationship between water "cost," as they have defined it, and population growth.' They conduct a
correlation analysis between their "subsidy index"'47 for each of MWD's
twenty-seven member agencies, and the agencies' average annual population
growth since joining MWD. Unfortunately, this analysis suffers from several serious limitations.
First, their subsidy measure is inappropriate for studying the relationship between water cost and development. In addition to the problems identified in Section II, their measure does not reflect the price actually faced by
developers, businesses, and households. Water consumers in the Southern
California counties served by MWD do not make expansion or location de45. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 280 tbl.5.
46. See id. at 284-287.
47. See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 286-87 tbls. 9-10. This measure is
simply the total historical costs divided by total water withdrawals as described in Section II.
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cisions based on the "real cost" of water as defined by Erie and JoassartMarcelli. To the extent their decisions are influenced by water costs, users
refer to the per-unit water rate, rather than some total cost measure that is
largely independent of the quantity of water consumed. In fact, all potential
consumers of water in Southern California have faced equal unit costsMWD does not discriminate between regions. Consider a developer in
Southern California faced with a decision to build homes in either Los Angeles or Orange Counties in the 1940's or 1950's. The developer knew that his
clients would ultimately pay the same amount in water-related costs, no matter where he decided to build.4 ' The MWD component of property taxes has
been the same across counties, and the volume-based water rate has been the
same. Recognizing this fact should end any discussion of growth generated
by water "subsidies."
In addition, most of the agencies drawing water from MWD have had
other sources to turn to. In particular, Los Angeles has obtained most of its
water from the Los Angeles Aqueduct, and at a lower average cost than water drawn from MWD. Therefore, the retail water price faced by Los Angeles consumers has actually had very little bearing on the "real cost" of IWD
water as measured by Erie and Joassart-Marcelli. The authors actually note
this earlier in their paper. They state: "...the retail cost of water to Los Angeles customers remained relatively low and did not represent an inhibitor to
development." 9 Here, the authors seem to recognize that retail price is what
matters to developers, and that this alone is the factor that can influence
growth. However, they seem to lose this point when they examine the correlation between water cost and growth later in the paper. There is no reason
to expect a relationship to exist between the authors' derived water cost and
growth. In order to study the true effect of water prices on growth, it would
be necessary to look at actual retail prices across all Southern California regions. These prices are determined by the cost of all the alternatives available to local water agencies (including groundwater, local reservoirs, and the
Los Angeles Aqueduct, in addition to MWD), and the pricing mechanisms
employed by the agencies.
Not surprisingly, the statistical fit found by Erie and Joassart-Marcelli
suggests a much less important relationship than they imply. Their finding
of a modest statistical relationship between water cost and growth in the
1929-1970 period, denoted by an R 2 of 0.383, does not necessarily support a

48. There may be differences in costs faced by end-users associated with the rate structures of the individual municipal water agencies. Even though all of MWD's members face
the same volume-based water rate, the agencies may choose to pass these costs on to their users in different ways. For example, some may include sewage fees or other charges in the
volume-based rate they collect. MWD has recently begun charging additional fixed fees to its
member agencies, known as "standby" and "connection" charges. These have only been in
place, however, since 1993 and 1996, respectively, and thus have not contributed to historical
differences in population growth.
49. Id. at281.
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claim that "the relationship is quite robust."5' They give no indication of
what they mean by "robust," or what the standard is for such a claim. In a
statistical context, "robust" generally means that the results would not
change significantly if the input data were altered slightly. Yet, in the very
next sentence, the authors point out that the result is "fundamentally driven
' indicating that just a couple of outliers may be the
by two key agencies,"51
source of their result. This statement also contradicts an earlier claim by the
authors, that "the early subsidy/growth relationship also appears to hold for
all 27 member agencies. 52 Even a cursory examination of the data indicates
that the relationship is far less direct than they imply.
Erie and Joassart-Marcelli imply a degree of causality in this relationship; lower water costs, as measured by the "subsidy index," lead to faster
growth. While lower water prices, as measured by the incremental cost
faced by developers or other consumers, undoubtedly have some effect on
growth, the analysis presented in their paper does not demonstrate such causality. As the authors admit, there are many other variables that are likely to
affect population growth. 3 These variables include transportation access,
weather, zoning and environmental regulations, property taxes (exclusive of
water costs), and pre-existing uses. The introduction of any one of these
variables could virtually eliminate the correlation found in their analysis.
Perhaps most importantly, the idiosyncrasies of their measurement
method may themselves lead to a false conclusion regarding causality. Causality may, in fact, be in the reverse direction. Because of the way the authors calculate their "subsidy index," rapid population growth will, by
definition, lead to lower costs (and higher "subsidies"). For example,
because San Diego had a small property base when it was annexed into
MWD, its initiation fees were relatively low. However, as San Diego grew
rapidly, it began to draw a greater share of the water supply. This reduced
the average historical cost per unit of water consumed. Thus, high
population growth "causes" the subsidy level (as measured by Erie and
Joassart-Marcelli) to rise, rather than the vice versa. The fact that the
correlation between growth and subsidy level is stronger in the 1929-1970
period than in the 1971-1996 period could just as readily support this
interpretation. As the authors note, both the degree and variation of this
"subsidy" was greater in the early period. 4
To confirm this fact, we used a statistical test known as the "Granger
Causality Test" to determine in which direction the causality actually runs.
This test identifies whether historical values of one variable help explain the
pattern observed in a second variable, or vice versa. In this case, the test
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 280.
Id.
Id. at 279.
See Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 287.
See id. at 285 & tbl.8.

55. For a more in-depth description of the method, see
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will help us determine if historical values of the water subsidy (as defined by
Erie and Joassart-Marcelli) explain, or "cause," population growth, or, alternatively, if historical values of population growth explain the water subsidy.
It is also possible that neither one "causes" the other, but that they are simply
both correlated with a third set of variables.
Table 6 shows the results of these tests.56 We find that for most of the
Southern California regions, population growth actually "caused" the increased water subsidy, rather than the reverse as implied by Erie and Joassart-Marcelli. For San Diego and San Bernardino, no causation was identified in either direction. For Ventura, the test determined that some causation
was evident, but that the direction was indeterminate. This confirms what
we have stated above: water "subsidies," as defined by the authors, have not
been a factor in the different growth rates experienced by Southern California's various regions. This should be no surprise, since all consumers and
potential consumers of water in Southern California face identical water
prices.
TABLE 6

Does the Water
Subsidy "Cause"
Population Growth?
F-Statistic'
City of LA
0.37
Los Angeles
0.49
Orange
0.84
San Diego
0.67
Riverside
0.60
San Bernardino
0.60
Ventura
3.59

Result
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Does Population
Growth "Cause" the
Water Subsidy?
F-Statistic1
2.57
16.62
3.09
0.97
4.42
2.18
2.86

Result
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

IAn F-statistic of about 2.5 represents a 95 percent confidence level.
In conclusion, Erie and Joassart-Marcelli's statistical analysis does not
support their conclusion that, "The Metropolitan Water District... for forty
years subsidized suburban sprawl ...at the expense of the taxpayers and

INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS wiTH APPLICATIONS 113 (4 th ed. 1998). See also C.W.J.
Granger, Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-SpectralModels,
37 ECONOMETRICA 424-438 (1969) (describing the statistical methods involved in the Granger

Causality Test.).
56. Two time series regressions were run using annual data, by region. First, we ran a
regression with current year population growth as the dependent variable and lagged values of
both population growth and water cost (calculated on an annual basis) as independent values.
The second regression used the same independent variables but used current year water cost
as the dependent variable.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss1/9
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ratepayers of the metropolitan center.
VI.

57

INCREMENTAL PRICES WILL ELIMINATE SUBSIDIES-NOT
PERPETUATE THEM

Erie and Joassart-Marcelli come to the conclusion that "charg[ing] only
nominal wheeling rates for water purchased from the Imperial Valley could
further institutionalize this long-term pattern of subsidization."" The authors are apparently referring to the state law that requires wheeling charges
through unused capacity to be set at a measure of "fair compensation" as defined by statute for facilities used.59 However, even if subsidies occurred in
the past, this assertion is simply not correct. In fact, incremental cost-based
pricing guards against subsidies and should promote "smart growth" as opposed to sprawl.
Incremental cost-based pricing requires that water rates cover current
and, to some extent, future costs. These rates reflect economically efficient
prices. Consumers cover the costs of the goods or services they buy, including both operating costs and capital costs. Under incremental cost pricing,
prices rise if there is congestion or shortages. Price increases can then provide the means to cover any expansion made necessary by the limits on
available capacity. This guarantees that all further expansion costs are recovered and that consumers are made aware of the costs of increased demand.' Historical costs are "sunk" and are irrelevant to efficient pricing.
To the extent that the recovery of prior investment costs is jeopardized
by a switch to incremental pricing, some other mechanism can be established
to handle the problem. This is precisely what has taken place in California,
where the electric utility industry has recently been restructured. For a lim57. Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 1, at 290.
58. Id. MWD and SDCWA have entered into a contract to exchange conserved water
that is made available to SDCWA by the Imperial Irrigation District. The exchange has a
pricing structure for firm transportation that includes capital and other costs directly associated with the transportation of the water on a regular basis. Additional financial considerations are also included. Erie and Joassart-Macelli's reference to "nominal wheeling rates" is a
mischaracterization.
59. CAL. WATER CODE § 1812(b) (West 2000). The issue of the proper calculation of
"fair compensation" for wheeling water as required by the Water Code was the subject of litigation initiated by MWD to validate certain wheeling rates charged to its member agencies,
which resulted in a ruling invalidating its rates. See Metropolitan Water Dist. Of Southern
Cal. v. All Persons Interested, et al., No. BC164076 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 1998). The
judgment invalidating MWD's rates was subsequently reversed upon appeal. See Metropolitan Water Dist. Of Southern Cal. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., et. al., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (2000).
The Imperial Irrigation District, the SDCWA, the Center for Public Interest Law, the Chernehuevi Indian Tribe, the Quechan Indian Tribe, and Cadiz, Inc. were all defendants in the validation action.
60. Note that when common or joint costs are present, incremental pricing may be inadequate to cover total costs. In such cases, it may be necessary to modify rates to reflect the
relative price sensitivities of customer groups. Such modifications, however, should maintain
the link between the specific services provided, their costs, and customer demands.
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ited time period, utilities are allowed to collect for certain "stranded costs,"
assets deemed uneconomic after restructuring, in their rates. Note that, in
the case of MWD, the risk of stranding prior investments may be quite small
in view of the growing demand for water and limits on existing transportation infrastructure.
"Smart growth" is best served when water is priced to reflect its true incremental or marginal cost. Consumers must be guided by the cost of the
next increment of water demanded. Not only should prices reflect incremental costs, they must be tied to the provision of specific services. Rather
than perpetuate a subsidy, a move to incremental cost pricing will create the
proper incentives for efficient consumption. To the extent that water costs
influence economic development, incremental cost-based prices will provide
the correct signals unencumbered by history's mistakes. MWD's current
pricing and financing practices are the ones that perpetuate inefficient signals to consumers and are detrimental to "smart growth."
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